What your Law 17 and Law 34 papers should look like:

1. Title of your Paper
2. Thesis Statement
3. Scope of the Paper
4. Body of your Paper
5. Footnotes

note: (for more information read about "The Classical Argument" - click here)

format:
1. Length: no less than 50 paragraphs, nor more than 100.
2. At least (5) different cases cited under footnotes
3. Writing must be original, that is "yours", and not "copy and pasted" from elsewhere.
$. Anything you do "copy and paste" must be "between quotes" and must have a footnote, and the webpage, or URL where you got it

Sample Paper:

1. Title of Paper

Give a name to your paper

"Sellers Beware: Caveat Emptor Under Fire in New York"

2. Thesis Statement

Stakeout your "claim" - that is give your "interpretation" on the reading and research you have down, and later you will support that with evidence, facts, and argument

Recent jurisprudence in New Jersey threatening to abrogate entirely the common-law
doctrine of caveat emptor in that state as it applies to the sale of real estate (though the Legislature
effected a limited rescue of the doctrine), has raised concerns among builders and sellers of real
estate in New York. (For details see box at p. ____) However, a review of recent jurisprudence in
New York suggests that courts here are unlikely to go as far in eroding the doctrine as it applies to
real estate transactions. On the other hand, a bill that Governor Pataki vetoed in December,1 (“NY
Bill”) would have caused substantial confusion about the respective rights and duties of sellers and
purchasers, and a potentially significant erosion of the doctrine. Though the NY Bill was vetoed last
year (on the last possible day), similar legislation has been proposed in prior years and is likely to
come up again.
3. Scope of this Paper

Tell the reader what you are going to discuss and what you are "not" going to discuss. This then limits your paper to somehting reasonable (i.e. 50-100 paragraphs or 10-20 pages - you will post

This article will discuss recent jurisprudence in New York to evaluate whether New York
courts are as prepared as the New Jersey courts (absent legislative intervention) to impose new
disclosure obligations and do away with purchasers’ independent duties to investigate. Next,
because a version of the NY Bill is likely to be proposed again, this article will discuss the
possibility that the bill would have effected a similar erosion of caveat emptor as the Strawn decision
did in New Jersey (before the Legislature intervened). Finally, this article will discuss protective
steps to be taken by sellers in light of this still-unfolding history.

4. Body of your Research or Legal Writing Paper

This is where you provide your interpretation. Any work that is "copied and pasted" must be "placed between quotes", and underlined and then followed by a footnote, eg. 1, 2,3, which appears also at the bottom under footnotes.


NY Courts Still Adhere to Caveat Emptor
New York Courts, like those in New Jersey, have in past decades been re-examining the
application of caveat emptor to real estate transactions. However, while recognizing the need for
the common law to evolve, New York courts, in sharp contrast to the courts of New Jersey,
emphasize their continued adherence to the doctrine. Indeed, the reasoning they employ in adopting
new interpretations in particular cases proceeds directly from the core logic of the doctrine itself:
the duty of purchasers to exercise reasonable intelligence and use the means available to assess for
themselves the nature of the deal. Still, recent decisions suggest the New York courts are prepared
to recognize duties of disclosure on the part of sellers previously thought to be precluded by the
doctrine1. At the same time, unlike in New Jersey, even when recognizing new disclosure duties on
the part of sellers, New York courts adhere unambiguously and steadfastly to the principle that
regardless of a seller’s duties, purchasers cannot claim they were induced into a transaction by a
seller’s misrepresentation or non-disclosure, where they themselves could have discovered the
nature of the deal by conducting reasonable inquiry. However, while this threshold seems plainly
greater than the condition recognized by the New Jersey courts (prior to legislative intervention),
simply that the relevant facts not be “readily observable” by the purchaser (see box at p. ____), New
York courts also find in some cases that the question whether the threshold is met involves questions
for the trier of fact. Thus, sellers in many cases are not likely to be spared the expense, delay and
risk of a jury trial.

New York decisions recognizing the principle that claims can be brought against sellers for
“active concealment,” in reality reinforce and rely on the fundamental logic of caveat emptor. For
example, in London v. Courduff, the Appellate Division, Second Department, stated that in order
to successfully show active concealment, “the plaintiffs must show in effect that the defendants had
thwarted their efforts to fulfill their responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor.”2 The
court cited the well-settled principle that sellers of real property who deal at arms length are under
no duty to speak, absent some act or conduct which deceives the purchaser, and that rather “[the
buyer has the duty to satisfy himself as to the quality of his bargain under the doctrine caveat
emptor, which in New York State still applies to real estate transactions.”3 Courts continue to apply
the rule that a claim for active concealment requires a showing that the seller affirmatively thwarted
the purchaser’s efforts to fulfill her or his duty of investigation.4 However, it should be noted that
“active concealment” includes not only physically covering up a defect, but also making “a
representation good as far as it goes, but accompanied with such a suppression of facts as to make
it convey a misleading impression.”5

Similar reliance on the basic logic of caveat emptor is apparent in the most recent Court of
Appeals decision to address the continued viability of the doctrine, wherein the Court recognized
an implied, common-law “Housing Merchant” warranty of habitability (now superseded by statute).6
While emphasizing the need for evolution in the doctrine, the Court in Caceci v. DiCanio
nonetheless limited its holding to cases where the purchaser contracts for the construction and sale
of a new home. Crucially, the reason for such limitation is that in such cases, as opposed to cases
where the contract is made after the house is constructed, the purchaser has no opportunity to inspect
the house for him or herself, because it has yet to be constructed, and so can only rely on the buildervendor
to deliver what was bargained for.7 Thus, while recognizing a modification or departure from
the traditional rule of caveat emptor, the Court of Appeals did so only to the extent that purchasers
could not, by any reasonable degree of diligence, discover the defects for themselves (because the
house is yet to be constructed). Once again, the exception proves the rule that where purchasers
have the means available to discover facts material to their bargain, it is their duty to do so.
The same principle is again reinforced in a recently developed “exception” to caveat emptor
which finds support in the decision in Stambovsky v. Ackley.8 According to the purchaser’s
allegations in that case, the seller publicized her assertion in the local community that the subject
Nyack house was haunted by poltergeists, but failed to disclose the same to the purchaser. The
Appellate Division held that the lower court improperly granted the seller’s motion to dismiss the
cause of action for rescission, observing:

The doctrine of caveat emptor requires that a buyer act prudently to assess the fitness
and value of his purchase and operates to bar the purchaser who fails to exercise due
care from seeking the equitable remedy of rescission...It should be apparent,
however, that the most meticulous inspection and the search would not reveal the
presence of poltergeists at the premises or unearth the property’s ghoulish reputation
in the community.9

However, the court emphasized also the fact that the seller had herself created the condition in
question (the house’s local reputation for being haunted).10

The Stambovsky decision continues to be law in New York. Subsequent stigmatized property
legislation only bars causes of action for non-disclosure of two limited sorts of stigmas: (1) that an
existing or prior owner or occupant is or was ever suspected to be infected with the HIV virus or
other disease highly unlikely to be transmitted through subsequent occupancy, or (2) that the
property is suspected to have been the site of a homicide, suicide or other death or felony.11

Moreover, recent decisions have not only reaffirmed the holding in Stambovsky, but have not
required that the seller herself created the condition complained of. Instead, they have simply
emphasized the requirement that the relevant condition be peculiarly within the seller’s knowledge
and not likely to be discovered by a reasonable inquiry by the purchaser.12 The lower court in
Haberman v. Greenspan, decided before Stambovsky, had likewise found that a duty to speak arises
“where there are circumstances peculiarly or exclusively within the knowledge of one party,
materially affecting the property, and he is or should be aware that the other party is dealing with
him in ignorance of such factors or on the assumption of some other state of facts.”13

Conclusion

Give your conclusions here about your paper

The protection provided sellers by the doctrine of caveat emptor is not as extensive as it once
was. Sellers in New York may be held liable, not only in cases where they engage in affirmative
misrepresentation, active concealment, or partial disclosure so misleading as to amount to a
misrepresentation, but also in cases where there are no accessible public records or other means
readily available to purchasers to discover the facts omitted. However, in circumstances where
purchasers can by reasonable investigation discover the facts omitted or allegedly misrepresented,
and where sellers do not actively thwart such discovery, the doctrine of caveat emptor still applies
in New York to bar such claims. Under such circumstances, well-crafted merger and disclaimer
clauses continue to provide significant, additional protection. Governor Pataki’s veto of the New
York Disclosure Bill prevented, for the moment, a substantial legislative erosion of the common-law
doctrine of caveat emptor and a possible erosion of the effectiveness of such merger and disclaimer
clauses. However, the likelihood that the Legislature will continue to consider and pass legislation
similar to the recently-vetoed bill, leaves room for substantial uncertainty about the future. But
given that courts continue to enforce specific merger and disclaimer clauses, and given at least the
substantial possibility that they will enforce such clauses, even against statutory claims that may be

4. Footnotes:

Be sure to give the name of the case or code, all cases or codes are underlined, and also provide the website" eg. http://yahoo.com/casename.htm

1. PROPERTY CONDITION DISCLOSURE ACT, N.Y. A.B. 1173, 222d Ann. Leg. Sess. (1999)
(vetoed on December 8, 2000, after being sent to the Governor on November 27, 2000).
2. London v. Courduff, 141 A.D.2d 803, 804, 529 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d
Dept. 1988), leave denied, 73 N.Y.2d 809, 537 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. 1988).
3. Id.
4. See Jee Foo Realty Corp. v. Lemmle, 259 A.D.2d 401, 402, 687 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (N.Y.
App. Div., 1st Dept. 1999).
5. Haberman v. Greenspan, 82 Misc.2d 263, 265, 368 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Richmond Co. 1975). See Striker v. Graham Pest Control Co., Inc., 179 A.D.2d 984, 984-85,
578 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720-21 (N.Y. App. Div., 3d Dept. 1992), lv. dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 1040, 584
N.Y.S.2d 449 (N.Y. 1992).
6. Caceci v. Di Canio Construction Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 530 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. 1988).
See Fumarelli v. Marsam Development, Inc., 92 N.Y.2d 298, 302, 680 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (N.Y.
1998).
7. Caceci, 72 N.Y.2d at 58-59, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 774 (N.Y. 1988).
8. 169 A.D.2d 254, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dept. 1991).
9. Id., 169 A.D.2d at 258-59, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 676 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dept. 1991).
10. Id., 169 A.D.2d at 259, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 676 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dept. 1991).
11. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 443-A (1995 N.Y. LAWS CH. 606).
12. See Trustco Bank, N.A. v. Cannon Building of Troy Assoc., 246 A.D.2d 797, 799, 668
N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (N.Y. App. Div., 3d Dept. 1998).
created by legislation in coming years, sellers of previously occupied housing (i.e., those covered
by the proposed NY Bill) should continue including such clauses in their contracts as should
builders/developers of new housing.